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ABSTRACT 
Is international law developing towards the recognition of a 
peremptory obligation for States and international organizations to 
stabilize anthropogenic greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, so as to 
collectively attain a sustainable global average temperature increase? Do 
States have an obligation to cooperate and achieve this objective? Does 
such an obligation extend to non-State subjects? This Article explores the 
possibility that a new peremptory norm is progressively emerging in 
international law to contain global average temperature increase within 
sustainable limits, currently well below 2°C and possibly even 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels under the Paris Agreement, as well as its 
nature and scope. Arguably, the international and domestic practice of 
sovereign entities, civil society and NGOs is supportive, including the 
quasi-universal participation of States and international organizations 
in the UNFCCC and related instruments. Furthermore, the fundamental 
and shared nature of the atmosphere and climate, which cannot be 
adequately protected via conventions, compels thinking in terms of a goal-
oriented erga omnes duty akin to an obligation of result, triggering 
universal invocation of responsibility, sanctions, and enforcement. In 
light of the evolution of international law, the obligation to achieve 
sustainable anthropogenic GHG emissions could also address non-State 
natural and legal persons as both duty-bearers and right-holders, waiving 
immunity and triggering universal jurisdiction. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Scientific evidence demonstrates that climate change is a 
reality that threatens the environmental stability of the earth, with 
serious implications for life. According to recent data, the world 
is on track to experience an average increase in air temperature 
of more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels.1 The latest studies 
prove that, whilst periodic warming has taken place on earth 
through the ages, significant warming has only happened on a 
 
1. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, AR5, LONG-TERM CLIMATE CHANGE: PROJECTIONS, 
COMMITMENTS AND IRREVERSIBILITY 1031 (2013); Xiaoxin Wang, Dabang Jiang & 
Xianmei Lang, Climate Change of 4C Global Warming above Pre-industrial Levels, 35 
ADVANCES ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 757, 758 (2018); Alan Buis, Study Confirms Climate Models 
Are Getting Future Warming Projections Right, NASA (Jan. 9, 2020), 
https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2943/study-confirms-climate-models-are-getting-future-
warming-projections-right [https://perma.cc/R8KH-HABP]. 
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global scale since the industrial revolution.2 In absolute terms, 
major emitters of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) include the United 
States, Canada, China, India, Russia, and Japan.3 Major per capita 
emitters include Australia, the United States, Canada, and Saudi 
Arabia.4 
Global warming causes phenomena such as sea-level rise, 
changing ocean currents, weather patterns, and desertification, 
which affect the foundations of society, including the enjoyment 
of basic claims such as the rights to self-determination, life, 
health, and culture.5 The threat is impelling and not much time 
remains to take action to avert it.6 According to a classical model 
of multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) based on a 
framework convention and additional protocols, the 
international community addresses the issue of anthropogenic 
GHG emissions essentially via obligations established under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”)7 and related regulatory instruments. In light of 
such a premise, this Article sets out to assess the nature of the 
obligation to achieve sustainable anthropogenic GHG 
concentrations in the atmosphere. More specifically, the analysis 
focuses on the question whether this duty is emerging as a 
peremptory international obligation. This is a critical step and 
 
2. Raphael Neukom, Nathan Steiger, Juan José Gómez-Navarro, Jianghao Wang & 
Joannes Werner, No Evidence for Globally Coherent Warm and Cold Periods over the 
Preindustrial Common Era, 571 NATURE 550 (2019), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1401-2; The Great Climate Conundrum, 12 
NATURE GEOSCIENCE 581 (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41561-019-0428-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5694-8832]. 
3. Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, CO2 and Other Greenhouse Gas Emissions – 
Cumulative CO2 Emissions (Aug. 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-
greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/V88T-7YAZ]. 
4. Id. 
5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C 
– SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 9 (2018); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAND – SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 7 (2019); 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, THE OCEAN CRYOSPHERE – SUMMARY 
FOR POLICYMAKERS 10 (2019). 
6. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C 
– MITIGATION PATHWAYS COMPATIBLE WITH 1.5°C IN THE CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 112 (2018). 
7. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 4, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
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arguably the only way to develop a compelling universal 
framework to address the problem of global warming. 
Part II of this Article outlines the criteria that identify a 
peremptory norm, particularly in light of recent work of the 
International Law Commission (“ILC”).8 Against this 
background, Part III considers the normative emergence of an 
erga omnes obligation for States and international organizations to 
curb anthropogenic GHG emissions via an essential analysis of 
the domestic and international practice of sovereign and non-
sovereign subjects. Part IV addresses the structure of the 
obligation in light of its content, notably as an erga omnes goal-
oriented cooperative duty akin to an obligation of result. Part V 
focuses on procedural implications, with respect to invocation of 
responsibility, sanctions, and enforcement. Part VI explores the 
possibility that, besides sovereign entities, the obligation at issue 
also addresses non-State natural and legal persons as both duty-
bearers and right-holders. Each Part defines a theoretical 
framework concerning the relevant aspects of an international 
obligation and contextualizes such theoretical elements by 
applying them to the obligation to achieve a sustainable 
concentration of anthropogenic GHG emissions in the 
atmosphere. 
II. CRITERIA IDENTIFYING A PEREMPTORY NORM 
There are no universal criteria to establish a peremptory 
norm.9 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (“VCLT”)10 provides: 
Treaties Conflicting with a Peremptory Norm of General 
International Law (‘Jus Cogens’) 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with 
a peremptory norm of general international law. For the 
purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of 
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized 
 
8. ILC, Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), Text of the 
Draft Conclusions and Draft Annex Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on 
First Reading, 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.936 (May 29, 2019) [hereinafter Peremptory 
Norms] 
9. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 
(2006). 
10. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character.11 
Under VCLT Article 64 (Emergence of a New Peremptory 
Norm of General International Law (“Jus Cogens”), “[i]f a new 
peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any 
existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void 
and terminates.” The same rules are embedded in Articles 53 and 
64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations (“VCLTIO”).12 On this basis, the ILC assumes that 
there are two criteria for identifying a peremptory norm: its 
general nature (1) and its universal acceptance as a non-
derogable rule (2).13 Indeed, acceptance of non-derogability is 
considered the distinguishing feature of jus cogens with respect to 
other general obligations.14 
More specifically, peremptory norms are indivisible general 
obligations, that is, duties owed by legal persons to the 
international community as a whole, which are also classified as 
“erga omnes” obligations.15 These are indivisible general duties: 
since they are non-severable, such obligations are necessarily non-
derogable by means of bilateral or multilateral agreements, as 
general consensus is required for derogation. In other words, an 
erga omnes obligation jointly binds a subject vis-à-vis all the other 
subjects of the international legal system as a unitary duty, 
embedding a set of interdependent claim-obligation relations, 
whereby there is a “fusion” of inter-personal duties.16 
Consequently, a sovereign entity cannot regulate such a duty 
without the consent of all the sovereign entities enjoying 
 
11. See also Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 1. 
12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15. 
13. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 1-2, Conclusion 4. 
14. Id. at 2, Conclusion 6.  
15. Id. at 4, Conclusion 17; see also Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 151 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 10, 1998); ILC, Rep. 
to the General Assembly on the Work of the Seventy-First Session, 190-192, U.N. Doc. 
A/74/10 (2019) [hereinafter ILC Report]. 
16. Willem Riphagen, State Responsibility: New Theories of Obligation in Interstate 
Relations, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 581, 609-10 (Ronald 
St. John MacDonald & Donald Johnston eds., 1983). 
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correlative rights. In other words, if an obligation is erga omnes, it 
is necessarily cogens.17 
In light of the univocal correspondence between duties and 
rights, the erga omnes obligations of A vis-à-vis B and C, B vis-à-vis 
A and C, as well as C vis-à-vis A and B entail correlative erga omnes 
rights.18 In fact, the erga omnes obligation of A and B vis-à-vis C 
matches the erga omnes right of C vis-à-vis A and B, who also enjoy 
the same position. Indeed, Hohfeld underscored that “a duty is 
the invariable correlative of that legal relation which is most 
properly called a right or claim.”19 More specifically, Keslen 
pointed out that the ‘“right’ or ‘claim’ of an individual is merely 
the obligation of the other individual or individuals,” since “if 
one designates as ‘right’ the relation of one individual toward 
whom another individual is obligated to a certain behaviour, then 
this right is merely a reflection of the obligation.”20 Erga omnes 
obligations are different from severable universal duties and 
rights, such as the freedom of the high seas, which is bilaterally 
and multilaterally negotiable, hence only theoretically generally 
applicable. 
Peremptory norms are identified particularly based on the 
content of an obligation, that is, the interest protected, which 
requires a case-by-case assessment.21 The interest protected is 
indeed the element that makes an obligation universal and 
indivisible, hence non-derogable.22 Against this analytical 
background, the ILC has outlined principal and subsidiary 
sources to identify peremptory norms. Among principal sources, 
there are domestic and international acts of States, such as public 
statements, diplomatic correspondence, legislation, decisions of 
national courts and treaty provisions, as well as resolutions 
 
17. THOMAS WEATHERALL, JUS COGENS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL 
CONTRACT 11, 352 (2015); DANIEL COSTELLOE, LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF PEREMPTORY 
NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (2017). The opposite, however, is not necessarily true, 
because States might agree on the peremptory nature of an obligation for reasons other 
than its non-severable structure. 
18. See HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (2d ed. 2019). 
19. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-33 (1913); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 717 (1916). 
20. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 127 (Max Knight trans., 1989). 
21. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 43. 
22. Christian Dominicé, The International Responsibility of States for Breach of 
Multilateral Obligations, 10(2) EUR.  J. INT’L L. 353, 356-57 (1999). 
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adopted by an international organization or intergovernmental 
conference.23 Subsidiary sources include the case law of 
international courts, particularly the ICJ, work of specialized 
bodies, such as the ILC itself, and scholarly opinions.24 In light of 
this framework, it is legitimate to investigate whether there is a 
possible evolution of the obligation to curb anthropogenic GHG 
emissions into a peremptory norm of general international law, 
considering the key steps in this trajectory. 
III. THE EMERGENCE OF AN ERGA OMNES OBLIGATION TO 
ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
A. International Treaties: The UNFCCC and Related Instruments 
According to the typical structure of MEAs, the main 
regulatory instruments on GHG emissions are the UNFCCC and 
related regulation. The Preamble to the UNFCCC provides that 
“change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects” is of 
concern “to humankind.” This implies that the breach of the 
obligation to curb GHG emissions is of interest to the 
“international community as a whole,” hence erga omnes.25 In this 
respect, it has been noted that the collective impact of climate 
change is much more serious than that of breaches of currently 
acknowledged peremptory norms.26 Recent developments 
confirm such views: the World Health Organization (“WHO”) 
considers that climate change puts ecosystems and wildlife under 
stress, increasing the likelihood of pandemics, and diminishes the 
capacity of society to respond, for instance, by aggravating water 
scarcity.27 In light of this premise, UNFCCC Article 2 provides: 
 
23. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 2-3, Conclusion 8; ILC Report, supra note 
15, at 168-70.  
24. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 3, Conclusion 9; ILC Report, supra note 15, 
at 170-74. 
25. Shinya Murase (Special Rapportuer), Second Report on the Protection of the 
Atmosphere, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/681, at 31-32 (Mar. 2, 2015). Similar considerations have 
been developed as concerns crimes against humanity (M. Cherif Bassiouni, International 
Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.  PROBS. 63, 68 (1996)). 
26. Mark Byrne, Climate Crime: Can Responsibility for Climate Change Damage Be 
Criminalised?, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 278, 280 (2010). 
27. Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19): Climate Change, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 22, 
2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/q-a-on-climate-change-and-covid-19 
[https://perma.cc/G6K5-VEND]. 
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The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related 
legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may 
adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.28 
This obligation is further spelled out in detail in UNFCCC 
Article 3, according to the precautionary principle: “[t]he Parties 
should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse 
effects.” Moreover, according to UNFCCC Article 4(1)(c), these 
obligations entail a cooperative effort, so that all Parties have to 
“[p]romote and cooperate in the development, application and 
diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and 
processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases.” 
Thus far, 197 Parties have ratified the UNFCCC. These 
include all Member States of the United Nations, as well as 
Palestine, Niue, the Cook Islands, and the European Union 
(“EU”).29 Together with the Montreal Convention on the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer, the UNFCCC is the closest treaty 
to universal participation, given that the Vatican is the only non-
party State.30 
Based on emission levels in 1990, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol 
outlined reduction targets for industrialized countries by 2012,31 
aiming to reduce GHG emissions by at least five percent below 
1990 levels (Article 3). Some industrial States extended Kyoto 
commitments up to 2020,32 whereas others agreed on voluntary 
 
28. UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 2. 
29. Id. 
30. Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General Close to Universal Participation, UNITED 
NATIONS (May 27, 2016), 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2016/Treaties/list_global_english.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9SYC-2A3S]. 
31. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
32. Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. C.N.718.201 (Dec. 8, 2012). 
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measures under the Copenhagen Accord.33 Article 3(1) of the 
Kyoto Protocol established that developed countries, as indicated 
in Annex I to the UNFCCC, should “individually or jointly, ensure 
that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent 
emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not 
exceed their assigned amounts.”34 To date, 192 Parties have 
ratified the Protocol, although critical States are not parties, 
notably Canada and the United States.35 Furthermore, the 
number of 144 States necessary for the entry into force of the 
Doha Amendment was reached on October 1, 2020, signaling 
“the willingness of the international community to deliver on key 
climate pledges.”36 
The Kyoto Protocol has been progressively replaced by the 
2016 Paris Agreement,37 which recognizes that climate change is 
“a common concern of humankind” (Preamble). The Agreement 
commits the Parties to “[h]olding the increase in the global 
average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels” and “pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 
1.5°C” (Article 2).38 Accordingly, Article 3 provides that, based on 
“nationally determined contributions, all Parties are to undertake 
and communicate ambitious efforts . . . with the view to achieving 
the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2.”39 In 
comparison with the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement 
involves a significant shift towards a collective effort to reduce 
anthropogenic GHG emissions. Thus far, 195 sovereign entities 
 
33. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the 
Conference of the Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/Add.1 
(Mar. 30, 2009). 
34. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31, art. 3(1). 
35. Id.; see generally Jon Hovi, Detlef Sprinz & Guri Bang, Why the United States Did 
Not Become a Party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US Perspectives, 18 EUR. J. 
INT’L RELATIONS 129 (2010); CAMILLA V. RAMOS FJELLVANG, WHY DID CANADA 
WITHDRAW FROM THE KYOTO PROTOCOL? (2014).   
36. Press Release, UNFCCC, Ratification of Multilateral Climate Agreement Gives 
Boost to Delivering Agreed Climate Pledges and to Tackling Climate Change (Oct. 2, 
2020), https://unfccc.int/news/ratification-of-multilateral-climate-agreement-gives-
boost-to-delivering-agreed-climate-pledges-and [https://perma.cc/H2ER-KSET]. 
37. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. (emphasis added). 
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have signed the Agreement and 191 have ratified it.40  The United 
States announced its withdrawal under the Trump presidency on 
June 1, 2017,41 with effectiveness from November 4, 2020, but 
newly elected President Biden announced that the United States 
will rejoin the Paris Agreement early during his mandate.42 
The quasi-universal participation of States in key conventions 
is a critical indicator of the emergence of a universal obligation.43 
However, the presence of a persistent objector would exclude the 
subjection of a State or other sovereign entity to a customary 
rule,44 rebutting the presumption of general acceptance and 
excluding universal application.45 If the conduct of States that 
have resigned from UNFCCC instruments, such as the United 
States under the Trump administration, were to be interpreted as 
a form of persistent objection, the existence of a quasi-universal 
obligation would still provide a basis for the possible affirmation 
of a peremptory norm.46 In fact, absolute universal acceptance is 
not necessary for the existence of jus cogens, which would be 
tantamount to establishing a power of veto;47 rather, the consent 
of a majority of States is required, including powerful ones.48 In 
this context, it can also be assumed that those States and other 
sovereign entities that do not take direct part in a given customary 
practice, but do not explicitly object to it, tacitly consent to such 
 
40. Paris Agreement - Status of Ratifications, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, 
https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification 
[https://perma.cc/8XV2-RWYQ] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021). 
41. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, U.S. EMBASSY & 
CONSULATES IT. (June 1, 2017), https://it.usembassy.gov/statement-president-trump-
paris-climate-accord [https://perma.cc/LH95-XVM4]. 
42. Quirin Schiermeier, The US Left the Paris Climate Deal: What’s Next?, NATURE 
(Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03066-x 
[https://perma.cc/5FQJ-DD27]. 
43. ILC, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A15509, at 188, 189 
(1963); CHRISTOS ROZAKIS, THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 66 
(1976); ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 111. 
44. Patrick Dumberry, Incoherent and Ineffective: The Concept of the Persistent Objector 
Revisited, 59 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 779 (2010); THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 102. 
45. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131,138-39 (Dec. 2018). 
46. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 2, Conclusion 5. 
47. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. V. S. Afri.), Judgment, 1966, I.C.J. 
6, 250, 291 (July 18) (dissenting Opinion by J. Tanaka). 
48. Dire Tladi, Second Report to the ILC on Jus Cogens, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/706 34-35, 
¶¶ 67-69 (2017). 
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a practice.49 The existence of a peremptory rule compelling 
sustainable GHG emissions would override possible objections 
and ensure the universal application of the obligation.50 
B. Other International Initiatives 
The UNFCCC system has been established within the context 
of significant international developments in environmental 
matters. As early as 1976, in his Fifth Report to the ILC, Professor 
Ago, First Rapporteur on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
(“DASR”), proposed a distinction between State “crimes” and 
“delicts.” Under Article 18, a crime was conceived of as a “serious 
breach by a State of an international obligation established by a norm 
of general international law accepted and recognized as essential by the 
international community as a whole.”51 State crimes included acts 
against “the conservation and the free enjoyment for everyone of 
a resource common to all mankind.”52 In 1980, the ILC approved 
the First Part of the DASR and included the notion of a State 
“crime” in Article 19, embedding the concept of “an 
internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a 
State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of 
fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is 
recognized as a crime by that community as a whole.”53 Among 
other offenses, State crimes included “a serious breach of an 
international obligation of essential importance for the 
safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such 
as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the 
seas.”54 This provision was later confirmed in the first complete 
version of the DASR approved by the ILC in 1996.55 
 
49. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1984, I.C.J. 246, 305, ¶ 130 (Oct. 12) (holding that acquiescence is 
“equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party 
may interpret as consent,” based on the principles of good faith and equity). 
50. See infra Section IV.A. 
51. Roberto Ago, Fifth Report on State responsibility: The Internationally Wrongful Act of 
the State, Source of International Responsibility, [1976] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 54, ¶ 155, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/291/Add.1&2 (emphasis added). 
52. Id. 
53. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-second Session, 
[1980] 2(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 32, UN Doc. A/35/10 (emphasis added). 
54. Id. (emphasis added). 
55. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 
[1996] 2(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 60, U.N. Doc. A/51/10. 
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On this basis, the Third Rapporteur to the ILC on State 
Responsibility, Professor Arangio-Ruiz, proposed a procedural 
mechanism allowing any State to unilaterally resort to the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). Article 17(1) included in 
his proposal for the Second Part of the DASR allowed any State 
to bring an alleged State crime to the attention of the UN Security 
Council or of the General Assembly. The Council or Assembly 
could then adopt a resolution at qualified majority, authorizing 
the complaining State to submit the case to the ICJ in order to 
obtain a consultative opinion or a judgment in a contentious 
procedure open to the intervention of all States. The ICJ would 
have been vested with the power to impose sanctions and to allow 
general countermeasures under Articles 16-18.56 
In light of the uncertainty of the notion of a State “crime,” 
the fourth Rapporteur on the DASR, Professor Crawford, 
proposed to replace this concept with the notion of a “serious 
breach of an erga omnes obligation,”57 triggering general 
invocation of responsibility and countermeasures.58 The final 
version of the DASR approved by the ILC in 2001 eventually 
replaced the concept of a State “crime,” including environmental 
offenses, with that of a “serious breach by a State of an obligation 
arising under a peremptory norm of general international law,”59 
entailing universal invocation of responsibility and 
countermeasures.60 Prospectively, the DASR might become a 
binding treaty.61 The same approach is replicated in Article 41 of 
 
56. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report on State Responsibility, [1993] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L 
L. COMM’N 42, ¶ 164, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/453/Add.3; Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh 
Report on State Responsibility, [1995] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 24, ¶¶ 108–112, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN. 4/469. 
57. James Crawford, First Report on State Responsibility, [1998] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L L. 
COMM’N 23, ¶¶ 92–93, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/490/Add.1–7; James Crawford, Third Report 
on State Responsibility, [2000] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 32, ¶ 96, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/507/Add.1–4; see also James Crawford, International Crimes of States, in THE LAW 
OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 405, 413 (James Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon 
Olleson & Kate Parlett eds., 2010). 
58. Crawford, Third Report, supra note 57, at 108, art. 51; JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 390-94 (2013). 
59. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, 
[2001] 2(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 112, U.N. Doc. A/56/10. 
60. Id. at 113, 117, 126, 137. 
61. G.A. Res. 71/33, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Dec. 
13, 2016). 
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the 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations (“DARIO”).62 
These developments have taken place against the 
background of the concept of “sustainable development,” which 
in 1987 the Brundtland Report qualified as “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs,” including 
environmental protection and eradication of poverty.63 
Therefore, the Report affirmed that “[a]ll human beings have the 
fundamental right to an environment adequate for their health 
and well being,”64 thus referring to an erga omnes right, hence 
duty, to a sustainable environment. This approach is consistent 
with Article 2(3) of the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development (“UNDRD”), which provides that “States have the 
right and the duty to formulate appropriate national 
development policies that aim at the constant improvement of 
the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals.”65 
Significantly, the UNFCCC Preamble and Articles 2, 3 and 
4(1)(d) establish a link between sustainable development and 
climate change. In 2017, the ILC recognized that, given that the 
atmosphere has “limited assimilation capacity,” States must 
ensure a “sustainable utilization,” including “the need to 
reconcile economic development with protection of the 
atmosphere.”66 
Along these lines, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment clearly recognized a “fundamental” right to 
a sustainable environment, which was couched in terms of a 
solemn commitment towards present and future generations for 
the protection of a globally common good.67 Considering hard 
law, at the regional level Article 24 of the 1981 African 
 
62. Report to the General Assembly on the Work of the Sixty-Third Session, [2011] 2(2) Y.B. 
INT’L L. COMM’N 82, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, 2(2). 
63. World Comm’n on Env’t and Dev., Our Common Future, Report ¶ 27 (1987). 
64. Id. Annex 1: Summary of Proposed Legal Principles for Environmental 
Protection and Sustainable Development Adopted by the WCED Experts Group on 
Environmental Law, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
65. G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development Art. 2(3) (Dec. 4, 
1986) (emphasis added). 
66. ILC, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 159 (2018), 
Guidelines on the Protection of the Atmosphere, Guideline 5. 
67. Report of the UN Conference on Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 4 (1972), Declaration on the Human Environment, Principle 1. 
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Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR”) provides 
that “all peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favorable to their development.” Whilst such a right 
has not yet been established under general international law, the 
1994 UN Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment 
recognized that “[a]ll persons, individually and in association with 
others, have the duty to protect and preserve the environment.”68 
In its work on jus cogens, the ILC has indicated a list of 
peremptory obligations.69 The list does not include a duty to curb 
GHG emissions, but it is not exhaustive. In this regard, according 
to the First Rapporteur to the ILC on jus cogens, Professor Tladi, 
“it might seem obvious that norms that aim at protecting the 
environment (at least some of them) would have the status of jus 
cogens,” but paradoxically “there is no strong evidence of non-
derogability,” notwithstanding “the empirical fact of the 
importance of environmental rules for the very survival of 
humanity and the planet.”70 Whereas this statement may be true 
as concerns the obligation to protect the environment, this does 
not necessarily adequately reflect the reality of the more specific 
obligation to curb GHG emissions. Indeed, the Rapporteur 
concedes that “[i]t may well be that some rules, like some relating 
to the environment, have the status of jus cogens which has yet to 
be accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole, with the result that the effects in law of jus cogens 
do not yet flow from such [rules].”71 Furthermore, the list drafted 
by the ILC includes two obligations that can be linked to an erga 
omnes obligation to curb GHG emissions, that is, the prohibition 
of crimes against humanity and the right to self-determination. 
Indeed, in 2018 the former Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
and the Environment, Professor Knox, recommended that the 
UN General Assembly recognize the “human right to a healthy 
environment” in “a global instrument.”72 In this regard, the ILC 
 
68. ECOSOC, Review of Further Developments in Fields with Which the Sub-
Commission Has Been Concerned: Human Rights and the Environment, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, Annex I, Principle 21 (1994) (emphasis added). 
69. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 5, Conclusion 23. 
70. Dire Tladi, Fourth Report to the ILC on Peremptory Norms of General International 
Law (Jus Cogens), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/727, at 61-62, ¶ 136 (2019). 
71. Id. 
72. John Knox, Report on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment 
of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, U.N. Doc. A/73/188 13, 17 ¶¶ 37, 
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has pointed out that the rules of international law relating to the 
protection of the atmosphere must be interpreted harmoniously 
with other relevant norms of international law, including those 
on trade, investment and human rights.73 Moreover, climate 
change particularly affects the right to self-determination of 
people, as acknowledged by the IPCC in the Fifth Assessment 
Report on Climate Change.74 In fact, the ILC’s 2018 Guidelines 
on the Protection of the Atmosphere highlight the “special 
situation of low-lying coastal areas and small island developing 
States due to sea-level rise.”75 More generally, the ILC has 
acknowledged that “the protection of the atmosphere from 
atmospheric pollution and atmospheric degradation is a pressing 
concern of the international community as a whole,” including 
“the interests of future generations of humankind.”76 This 
formulation was adopted in light of “the gravity of the 
atmospheric problems”77 and is a critical step in the recognition 
of the erga omnes nature of the obligation to curb GHG 
emissions.78 Indeed, in their comments on the obligation to 
protect the atmosphere under the ILC’s Guidelines, some States 
have underscored its erga omnes nature.79 
Turning to international case law, in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, 
the ICJ adjudicated upon the agreed construction of a barrier in 
the Danube River by Hungary and Slovakia, which Hungary 
 
46 (2018); see also David Boyd, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights 
Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, 
U.N. Doc. A/74/161 25, ¶ 96, (July 15, 2019). “A safe climate is a vital element of the 
right to a healthy environment and is absolutely essential to human life and well-being.” 
73.  ILC, supra note 66, at 187, Guideline 9. 
74. Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, AR5, Chapter 29, Small 
Islands, IPCC (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/ [https://perma.cc/D3PZ-
CGFV]. 
75.  ILC, supra note 66, at 158, Preamble. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 165, Commentary. 
78. Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly During Its Seventy-Third Session on the Work of the ILC of Its Seventieth 
Session (2018), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/724 20, ¶¶ 104, 107 (2019) (underscoring the erga 
omnes nature of the obligation to protect the atmosphere in light of its relevance to the 
international community as a whole). 
79. ILC, Protection of the Atmosphere: Comments and Observations Received 
from Governments and International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/735, at 21-22 
(Feb. 11, 2020) (confirming the stance of the Special Rapporteur Shinya Murase, Sixth 
Report on the Protection of the Atmosphere, UN Doc. A/CN.4/736 18 (Feb. 11, 2020)). 
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unilaterally abandoned.80 In the course of the dispute, Hungary 
argued that the “obligation not to cause substantive damage to 
the territory of another State” has evolved “into an erga omnes 
obligation of prevention of damage pursuant to the 
‘precautionary principle,’” overriding a conventional obligation 
to construct a barrier in the Danube River.81 Slovakia objected 
that “none of the intervening developments in environmental 
law” has given “rise to norms of jus cogens.”82 The ICJ held that 
“[n]either of the Parties contended that new peremptory norms 
of environmental law had emerged,” and the Court was 
consequently not required to examine the scope of VCLT Article 
64.83 However, in light of its previous advisory opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,84 the Court 
considered whether Hungary could invoke necessity on 
environmental grounds and underscored “the great significance 
that it attaches to respect for the environment, not only for States 
but also for the whole of mankind.”85 In his separate opinion in the 
case, Judge Weeramantry considered that a bilateral and 
multilateral approach to sustainable development and 
environmental protection “scarcely does justice to rights and 
obligations of an erga omnes character – least of all in cases 
involving environmental damage of a far-reaching and 
irreversible nature.”86 Therefore, “[i]nternational environmental 
law will need to proceed beyond weighing the rights and 
obligations of parties within a closed compartment of individual 
State self-interest, unrelated to the global concerns of humanity 
as a whole.”87 More specifically, in Certain Activities Carried Out by 
Nicaragua in the Border Area, Judge Dugard underscored that 
“[t]he obligation not to engage in wrongful deforestation that 
results in the release of carbon into the atmosphere and the loss 
 
80. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 
25, 1997). 
81. Id. at 62, ¶ 97. 
82. See id. 
83. Id. at 67. On VCLT Art. 64, see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
84. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 95, at 226, 241, ¶¶ 27-29 (1996). 
85. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 80, at 41, ¶ 53. 
86. Id. at 117 (separate opinion by Weeramantry, J.). 
87. Id. at 118 (separate opinion by Weeramantry, J.). 
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of gas sequestration services is certainly an obligation erga 
omnes.”88 
Scholars are divided on the possibly peremptory nature of 
international environmental norms.89 Birnie, Boyle, and 
Redgwell assume that there are no peremptory norms in 
international environmental law.90 Taking a diametrically 
opposite stance, Orakhelashvili considers that norms prohibiting 
large-scale pollution, including the no-harm rule, have a 
peremptory nature, particularly because massive pollution affects 
the international community as a whole.91 Similarly, Ragazzi 
highlights the erga omnes nature of environmental obligations.92 
The ILC has underscored that there is “support” for 
acknowledging the erga omnes nature of the obligations pertaining 
to global atmospheric degradation, but the legal consequences of 
such a recognition are not yet fully clear.93 Whereas such a 
comprehensive approach cannot be easily reconciled with the 
restrictive perimeter of jus cogens rules, it is sensible to argue that 
there is a sufficiently consistent practice to consolidate the opinio 
juris that, as a sub-species of the right to environmental 
sustainability, the obligation to cooperate and curb GHG 
emissions is evolving as an erga omnes duty.94 
C. Domestic Practice 
Currently, more than 178 States acknowledge the right to a 
sustainable environment via constitutions, statutes and court 
decisions.95 More than 100 States recognize the right to a 
 
88. See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica 
v. Nicar.), Compensation Owed by the Republic of Nicaragua to the Republic of Costa 
Rica, 2018 I.C.J. 15, 120 (Feb. 2, 2018) (dissenting Opinion by Dugard J., ad hoc). 
89. See WEATHERALL, supra note 17, at 259-60; ILC, supra note 66, at 175, Guideline 
3. 
90. See PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 109-10 (2009). 
91. See generally ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 65. 
92. See generally MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 157 (1997). 
93. See generally ILC, supra note 66, at 175. 
94. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 114 (explaining the customary nature of 
peremptory rules). 
95. See John H. Knox, Preliminary Report on Human Rights and the Environment, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/22/43 5, ¶ 12 (Dec. 24, 2012); DAVID BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
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sustainable environment at the constitutional level;96 for instance, 
this is the case of the Preamble to the French Constitution and 
Article 26 of the Chinese Constitution. It is therefore possible to 
conceive of the right to a sustainable environment as a general 
principle of law, that is, a principle inferred from the major legal 
systems of the world, according to ICJ Statute Article 38(2)(c). In 
fact, in his Preliminary Report on Human Rights and the 
Environment, Knox affirmed that “were the Universal 
Declaration [of Human Rights] to be drafted today, it is easy to 
imagine that it would include a right [to environment] 
recognized in so many national constitutions and regional 
agreements.”97 
This framework has provided domestic courts with a basis to 
develop consistent case law on the more specific right to a 
climatically sustainable environment. Notably, in Urgenda, a 
District Court in The Hague held the Netherlands responsible for 
excessive GHG emissions, based on a general duty of care.98 
According to the Court, since “the current global emissions and 
reduction targets of the signatories to the UN Climate Change 
Convention are insufficient to realise the 2° target,” the 
Netherlands “is obliged [under a duty of care] to take measures 
in its own territory to prevent dangerous climate change.”99 On 
October 9th, 2018, the Appeals Court of the Hague confirmed 
the decision of the District Court, upholding the duty of the 
Netherlands to reduce GHG emissions by at least twenty-five 
percent by 2020 compared to 1990 levels.100 However, the 
judgment of the Appeals Court shifts the focus from the duty of 
care to the rights to life and to private and family life under 
Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
ENVIRONMENT 45 (2012); see generally Marek Prityi et al., Locating Environmental Law 
Functions among Legislative, Judicial and Implementation Bodies, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
ACROSS CULTURES: COMPARISONS FOR LEGAL PRACTICE 43, 48-72 (Kirk W. Junker ed., 
2020).  
96. Knox, supra note 95, at 5, ¶ 12. See also Louis Kotzé & Wendy Muzangaza, 
Constitutional International Environmental Law for the Anthropocene?, 27 RECIEL 278, 281-
82 (2018) (discussing “global environmental constitutionalism”). 
97. See Knox, supra note 95, at 6. 
98. See Urgenda Foundation v. The Neth., Case n. HAZA C/09/00456689, 1 (2015). 
99. See id. ¶ 4.65. 
100. See Neth. v. Urgenda Foundation, Case n. 200.178.245/01, The Hague Court 
of Appeal, ¶ 73 (2018). 
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(“ECHR”).101 On December 20th, 2019, the Dutch Supreme 
Court confirmed this approach.102 Although the nature of the 
right to life is subject to debate, different sources support its 
peremptory structure.103 This has prompted a meaningful 
improvement in the climate policy of the Netherlands, triggering 
negotiations for a National Climate Act aiming to reduce GHG 
emissions by forty-nine percent compared to 1990 by 2030, and 
by ninety-five percent by 2050, including a completely carbon 
dioxide (“CO2”)neutral production of electricity.104 
In Barragán v Colombia, the Supreme Court of Columbia 
reversed the decision of a court of first instance and upheld the 
claim of twenty-five plaintiffs against the State and private 
corporations for depleting the Amazon rainforest and increasing 
CO2 emissions.105 The Court held the defendants in breach of the 
fundamental right to a safe environment, in violation of both the 
Colombian Constitution and the Paris Agreement.106 This 
decision is consistent with the jurisprudence of the High Court of 
Lahore, which held that the State of Pakistan must reduce its 
GHG emissions based, inter alia, on the constitutional rights to 
life and to a sustainable environment.107 More specifically, the 
Court held that “[f]rom environmental justice, which was largely 
localized and limited to our own ecosystems and biodiversity it is 
necessary to move to Climate Change Justice,” whereby 
“[f]undamental rights lay at the foundation of these two 
overlapping justice systems.”108 In Juliana v. United States, the US 
 
101. Id. at ¶¶ 40-43. 
102. See Neth. v. Urgenda Foundation, Case n. 19/00135, Supreme Court of The 
Netherlands, ¶¶ 5.9.1, 8.3.5 (2019). 
103. See Teraya Koji, Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond: 
From the Perspective of Non-Derogable Rights, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 917, 927 (2001); Tladi, supra 
note 70, at 57, ¶ 128. 
104. See Climate Policy, Report, https://www.government.nl/topics/climate-
change/climate-policy [https://perma.cc/HNZ4-4WKS] (last visited Mar. 17, 2021); 
Letter to the House of Representatives about the Proposal for a National Climate 
Agreement from the Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy (June 28, 2019); 
Dutch National Climate Agreement, June 28, 2019, 
https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2019/06/28/climate-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/KD2W-63NL] (last visited Mar. 17, 2021). 
105. See Barragán et al. v. Colom. Presidency et al., STC-4360-2018, Case n. 11001-
22-03-000-2018-00319-01, Supreme Court of Justice of Colombia 25-26 (2018). 
106. Id. at 45-46, ¶ 14. 
107. See Case WP n. 25501/2015, High Court of Lahore ¶ 12 (2015). 
108. Id. at 7. 
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District Court for the District of Oregon rejected a motion to 
dismiss a claim asserting the insufficiency of the US government’s 
policies to reduce GHG emissions, considering that “the right to 
a climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental 
to a free and ordered society.”109 Therefore, the Court 
determined that it can “make findings that define the contours 
of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to life and a habitable atmosphere and 
climate” and “declare the levels of atmospheric CO2s which will 
violate their rights,” thus being able to “direct the federal 
defendants to prepare and implement a national plan which 
would stabilize the climate system and remedy the violation of 
plaintiff’s rights.”110 The case is pending on appeal.111 
These developments can be interpreted as a sign of the 
emergence of a general principle of law, that is, a universal 
obligation, which compels the constraint of anthropogenic GHG 
emissions within sustainable limits, as a specific component of the 
broader obligation to achieve environmental sustainability. 
According to the views of Georges Scelle, internal practice can 
also be interpreted as a sign of reciprocal external recognition by 
States concerning the emergence of a customary international 
rule.112 In this respect, Knox concluded that the “[r]ecognition 
of the right to a healthy environment by the United Nations 
would complement, reinforce and amplify the regional and 
national norms and jurisprudence developed over the past 45 
years.”113 Furthermore, the 2007 Malé Declaration on the Human 
Dimension of Climate Change invokes the “fundamental right to 
an environment capable of supporting human society and the full 
enjoyment of human rights,” which is recognized in “the 
constitutions of over one hundred States and directly or indirectly 
in several international instruments.”114 According to the ILC, the 
 
109. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016). 
110. Id. 
111. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 2020). 
112. See generally GEORGES SCELLE, PRECIS DE DROIT DES GENS: PRINCIPES ET 
SYSTEMATIQUE (1932). 
113. Knox, supra note 72, at 13-14, ¶ 39. 
114. See Malé Declaration on the Human Dimension of Climate Change, ASS’N SMALL 
ISLAND STATES (2007), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Male_Declaration_Nov07.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L39K-WBRP]. 
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general principles of law afford a common basis for the 
establishment of jus cogens.115 
D. Practice of non-State Natural and Legal Persons 
Customary norms develop not only via State practice, but 
also emerge in a purposive way through societal processes that 
can be largely informal and unconscious, involving claims and 
reactions to claims.116 Thus, grassroots movements and, more 
generally, the activity of non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”) invoking a sustainable climate policy worldwide can be 
interpreted as a further sign of the emergence of a peremptory 
norm.117 
Various NGOs have contributed in a significant way to 
signaling and publicizing the importance and impact of climate 
change on present and future generations, backing the formation 
of the consciousness of humankind, which is the ultimate 
foundation of peremptory norms. NGOs have thus contributed to 
lobbying support for sustainable climate policies and have 
created decisive linkages between the scientific community and 
the public, as well as between global and local societies.118 Among 
innumerable initiatives, Friends of the Earth successfully led a 
campaign to prompt the UK government to pass the Climate 
Change Act 2008.119 The World Wildlife Fund (“WWF”) has 
tirelessly campaigned to prompt action against climate change, 
measure carbon footprints, and change life patterns.120 As 
 
115. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 2, Conclusion 5; ILC Report, supra note 
15, at 161-62. 
116. Daniel Bodanskiy, Prologue to a Theory of Non-Treaty Norms, in LOOKING TO THE 
FUTURE, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MICHAEL REISMAN 119, 130 (Mahnoush Arsanjani, Jacob 
Cogan, Robert Sloane & Siegfried Wiessner eds., 2011). 
117. Jean D’Aspremont, Non-State Actors and the Social Practice of International Law, in 
NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (Math Noortmann, August Reinisch & 
Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2015); ILC Report, supra note 15, at 167. 
118. Chiara Giorgetti, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Climate Change 
Negotiations, 9 COLO. J. INT’L ENV’T L. & POL’Y 115, 137 (1998); Christopher Rootes et al., 
Climate Change, National Politics and Grassroots Action: An Introduction, 21 ENV’T POL. 677, 
686 (2012); BENOÎT MAYER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CLIMATE CHANGE 249 (2018). 
119. Neil Carter, What Has the UK Climate Law Achieved and Where Next?, FRIENDS 
EARTH (Aug. 8, 2018), https://friendsoftheearth.uk/climate-change/what-has-the-uk-
climate-law-achieved [https://perma.cc/LT4Z-UY2U]. 
120. World Wildlife Fund, Who We Are, https://www.wwf.org.uk/who-we-are 
[https://perma.cc/58CB-AME5] (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
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concerns grassroots movements, campaigners began protesting 
outside the Swedish Parliament in 2018 and have now become the 
image of future generations threatened by climate change.121 
Businesses have also played an important role in supporting 
sustainable climate action. For instance, the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development brings together around 200 
chief executive officers to support the implementation of the 
Sustainable Development Goals.122 Often, NGOs collaborate with 
the public sector to foster sustainable climate initiatives. For 
example, the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Partnership (“REEEP”) is a cooperative platform for 
governmental and non-governmental actors that has promoted 
multi-stakeholder cooperation on renewable energy, climate 
change, and sustainable development.123 Normatively, UNFCCC 
Article 4(1)(i) acknowledges the critical role of NGOs in 
stimulating and increasing public awareness on climate change, 
as signatories must “[p]romote and cooperate in education, 
training and public awareness related to climate change,” 
encouraging “the widest participation in this process, including 
that of non-governmental organizations.”124 
Although they are not, strictly speaking, formally part of the 
acceptance and recognition of a norm as jus cogens,125 NGOs have 
played an important role in the development of climate change 
regulation. Indeed, UNFCCC Article 7(2)(l) recognizes that the 
Conference of the Parties (“COP”) can rely, where appropriate, 
on the services and cooperation of competent international 
organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental 
bodies, as well as information provided by them. Furthermore, 
UNFCCC Article 7(6) allows the participation of “[a]ny body, or 
agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-
governmental” in the COP. NGOs have thus had frequent 
 
121. See Ali Smith, They See Us as a Threat because We’re Having an Impact, GUARDIAN 
(July 21, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2019/jul/21/great-
thunberg-you-ask-the-questions-see-us-as-a-threat [https://perma.cc/EL69-C9VG]. 
122. News & Insights, WBCSD, https://www.wbcsd.org [https://perma.cc/9J9P-
3U3X] (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
123. Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency P’ship, About REEEP, 
https://www.reeep.org/about-reeep [https://perma.cc/5J4K-PNQW] (last visited Feb. 
4, 2021). 
124. UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4(1)(i).  
125. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 2, Conclusion 7, ¶ 3. 
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contacts with governmental representatives and have been kept 
informed on the progress of climate negotiations. Non-profit 
organizations that have played a significant part in climate change 
negotiations include the WWF, Climate Action Network, 
Greenpeace, the Environmental Defense Fund and the World 
Watch Institute.126 Among profit organizations, fossil-fuel-
intensive energy industries, the chemical industry, renewable 
energy businesses, and insurance companies have participated in 
UNFCCC negotiations via organs such as the Climate Council, the 
Global Climate Coalition and the International Climate Change 
Partnership.127 This means that the norms of the UNFCCC and 
related instruments that recognize the erga omnes importance of 
climate change for humankind also crystallize the societal 
consensus that NGOs have contributed to creating. 
IV. STRUCTURE OF THE OBLIGATION 
A. Content and Configuration 
The atmosphere is a gaseous envelop surrounding the 
earth128 and climate is average weather over a long period.129 
GHGs absorb infrared radiation and trap it in the atmosphere, 
causing global warming. The main sources of GHGs are CO2, 
nitrous dioxide (“N2O”), methane (“CH4”), and 
chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCS”),130 which are particularly emitted 
via fossil fuels (oil, coal and gas), agricultural activities, decaying 
organic matter, aerosol sprays, and air conditioning.131 
The atmosphere and climate are “global commons,” more 
specifically, “shared resources,” which are different from 
 
126. Giorgetti, supra note 118, at 127. 
127. Id. at 131-32. 
128. Laurent Cosineau, Atmosphere – Definition, CLIMATE CHANGE GUIDE, 
https://www.climate-change-guide.com/atmosphere-definition.html 
[https://perma.cc/WV6M-6TZP] (last visited Feb. 4, 2021); ILC, supra note 66, at 168, 
Guideline 1; Shinya Murase (Special Rapporteur), First Report to the ILC on the Protection 
of the Atmosphere 42, 47 ¶¶ 65, 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/667 (2014). 
129. What Is Climate?, WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG. (2019), 
http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/ccl/faq/faq_doc_en.html 
[https://perma.cc/4BNC-CWNC]. 
130. Susan Solomon et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 19, 23-24 (2007); Murase, supra note 128, at 51, ¶ 76. 
131. LUDIVINE TAMIOTTI ET AL., TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2009). 
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atmospheric airspace as a domain subject to appropriation:132 
damage is of “common concern.”133 Hence, if a State emits 
unsustainable GHGs, all other States of the international 
community are affected; furthermore, international 
organizations and non-State subjects are affected too. Climate 
change is also a specific case where all States of the international 
community are “directly injured” by the breach. In fact, although 
the negative effects of climate change vary in intensity in different 
States, it is impossible to distinguish between “directly” and 
“indirectly” injured States under DASR 48.134 Given the shared 
interest protected, a bilateral derogation from the obligation to 
achieve sustainable emissions between States A and B would also 
affect States C, D and E. The same principle applies under DARIO 
49.135 On this basis, it is possible to develop relevant inferences on 
the nature of the obligation breached. 
The debate over the legal protection of the atmosphere and 
climate as global commons leads to the conclusion that there is at 
least overlap between obligations protecting global commons, 
erga omnes duties and jus cogens.136 The framework is nonetheless 
not fully clear, so that some scholars conclude that it is preferable 
to address the question from the angle of the particular 
effectiveness of treaties, in light of VCLT and VCLTIO Article 60, 
which entails the possibility of a unilateral or multilateral 
suspension of a convention by the injured States.137 This approach 
is based on the concept of an “integral” or “interdependent” 
obligation, whereby the breach by a State or an international 
organization allows all other States and international 
organizations to withdraw from the obligation.138 However, this 
view obviously entails the possibility of a dissolution of the 
UNFCCC and related instruments: as in 2017 the United States 
resigned from the Paris Agreement, all States could withdraw 
from the Agreement, with disastrous consequences for the 
 
132. Murase, supra note 128, 52, 54, ¶¶ 79, 84. 
133. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Liability for Environmental Damage Caused to the Global 
Commons, 5 REV. EUR., COMPAR. & INT’L ENV’T L. 305 (1996); Global Commons, A 
DICTIONARY OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2d ed., 2018). 
134. Report, supra note 59, at 126. 
135. Report, supra note 62, at 89. 
136. Fitzmaurice, supra note 133, at 306-07. 
137. Id. at 310. 
138. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 93. 
2021] GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 947 
international community as a whole. The answer to this impasse 
is the affirmation of the universally non-derogable nature of the 
obligation to curb GHG emissions under customary law. In other 
words, the shared nature of the protected interest and its 
importance make it necessary to move from an integral and 
derogable erga omnes partes obligation139 to a universally non-
severable erga omnes duty.140 In light of the catastrophic 
consequences of the breach, a hypothetical bilateral or 
multilateral agreement allowing States and international 
organizations to exceed sustainable anthropogenic GHG 
emissions should be null and void. In fact, no treaty has thus far 
been concluded that derogates from the UNFCCC and related 
instruments; furthermore, the resignation of Canada from the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2011141 and that of the United States from the 
Paris Agreement in 2017 have not triggered significant 
withdrawal by other States. This signals that a collective 
consciousness is developing on the importance of the interest at 
stake as a universal and non-derogable one. 
A critical element for establishing the peremptory nature of 
a norm is the fact that it protects a fundamental interest from 
which no one must deviate, essentially belonging to the 
international “public order.”142 Peremptory rules “reflect and 
protect fundamental values of the international community, are 
hierarchically superior to other rules of international law, and are 
universally applicable.”143 In light of available scientific data,144 it 
can be safely assumed that ensuring a sustainable climate is the 
most fundamental environmental challenge for the international 
community.145 It is a classic case where the essential interests of 
the international community as a whole prevail over bilateral and 
multilateral interests.146 This is confirmed by the normative 
 
139. Crawford, Third Report, supra note 57, at 34-35, ¶¶ 106-07. 
140. Christina Voigt, State Responsibility and Climate Change Damage under 
International Law, 77 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 5, 14 (2008). 
141. Canada Withdraws from Kyoto Protocol, IISD (2011), 
http://sdg.iisd.org/news/canada-withdraws-from-kyoto-protocol 
[https://perma.cc/T37C-NJAL]. 
142. Prosecutor v. Furundžjia, Case n. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 153 (Dec. 10, 
1998); ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 36. 
143. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 1, Conclusion 3. 
144. IPCC, supra notes 1, 5. 
145. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 26, at 279-80. 
146. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 67. 
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evolution of regulation in the matter, whereby environmental 
protection is progressively being established as a fundamental 
right under international law, which raises the further possibility 
of conceiving of a right to a sustainable climate (correlative of the 
duty to curb carbon emissions) as a human right per se.147 
The peremptory nature of the obligation to achieve 
sustainable GHG emissions would allow individual States and 
international organizations to be considered bound without and 
despite their agreement.148 Indeed, according to the ILC, 
acceptance and recognition by “a very large majority of States” is 
necessary for the identification of a norm as a peremptory rule, 
but not absolute consensus by all States and international 
organizations.149 In this regard, the recognition of the importance 
of the obligation to curb GHG emissions for “humankind” 
embedded in the Preamble to the UNFCCC can be read as a sign 
of such acceptance.150 Critically, the persistent objector rule does 
not apply to jus cogens.151 Hence, even if the practice of a non-
cooperative international organization or a State, notably the 
United States under the Trump administration, were to be 
regarded as a form of persistent objection, this would not exclude 
the universally binding nature of the obligation to achieve 
sustainable GHG emissions, particularly in light of the quasi-
universal participation in the UNFCCC and related 
instruments.152 In any case, in light of its participation in the 
negotiation of the UNFCCC and related instruments, including 
the Copenhagen and Paris Agreements, the United States should 
not be considered a persistent objector to the formation of a 
universal rule compelling sustainable GHGs: no consistent 
 
147. See discussion supra Sections III.B and III.C. On the possibility of conceiving of 
the right to a sustainable climate as a human right per se, see Francesco Francioni & 
Ottavio Quirico, Untying the Gordian Knot: Towards the Human Right to a Climatically 
Sustainable Environment?, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 133 (Ottavio Quirico & Mouloud Boumghar eds., 
2016). 
148. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 107. 
149. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 2, Conclusion 7; ILC Report, supra note 
15, at 168.  
150. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
151. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 4, Conclusion 14. 
152. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
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contrary practice emerges,153 but rather variations in practice 
based on the prevailing political majority. 
B. A Goal-Oriented Cooperative Duty Akin to an Obligation of Result 
Having established that thinking about the obligation to 
achieve sustainable GHG emissions as a peremptory duty is a 
realistic perspective, it is necessary to consider how it is possible 
to frame the obligation more analytically, in light of the 
complexity of the interest protected. The 2001 DASR only 
establishes under Article 12 that State conduct not in conformity 
with an international obligation entails a breach of that duty, 
regardless of its origin or character, without any further 
distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations of 
result. The same principle applies under DARIO 11. Conversely, 
the 1996 DASR took a more analytical approach to the question 
and outlined a clear distinction between international obligations 
of conduct and result. Article 20 identified as “obligations of 
conduct” those that must be implemented through means 
specifically determined by the international obligation itself, 
whereby the obligation is breached by the failure to adopt a 
particular course of conduct.154 Article 21 outlined as “obligations 
of result” those that require a State to achieve a particular aim, 
leaving it to the State to achieve the objective by means of its own 
choice, whereby a State is in breach if it does not comply with the 
required outcome.155 The difference therefore depends on 
whether an international obligation requires the positive or 
negative performance of specific conduct, rather than the 
establishment or maintenance of a particular situation. Assessing 
whether an obligation is of conduct or of result necessitates a case-
by-case consideration of specific regulatory instruments.156 
Christina Voigt has qualified the duty to stabilize GHG 
emissions as an obligation of conduct. According to a complex 
argument, Voigt considers that “Article 4.2 UNFCCC in 
conjunction with Article 2 . . . obliges parties to take action to 
 
153. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgement, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 138-39 (Dec. 1951). 
154. Report, supra note 55, at 60. 
155. Id. 
156. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S DRAFT 
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 124 (2002). 
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adopt policies and measures to secure the stabilization of 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.”157 More 
precisely, the Parties to the UNFCCC would have an obligation 
“not to ‘defeat’ the objective,” committing “to the stabilization 
target” and being “bound by an ‘obligation of conduct’ to prevent 
dangerous climate change under Article 2 UNFCCC.”158 Scholars 
are divided on the nature of the more specific duty to “pursue 
domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the 
objectives of [nationally determined] contributions” under 
Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement, as an obligation of conduct 
rather than result.159 With respect to the broader obligation to 
protect the atmosphere, the ILC considers that “the States’ 
obligation ‘to ensure’ [that domestic activities do not cause 
significant harm] does not require the achievement of a certain 
result (obligation of result) but only requires the best available 
efforts so as not to cause significant adverse effects (obligation of 
conduct).”160 
Clearly, affirming that the obligation to curb GHG emissions 
is one of conduct would lead to significantly weakening the 
implications of its peremptory nature, because States and 
international organizations would not be compelled to achieve 
specific reduction targets, but only to pursue the best efforts to 
achieve them, regardless of the outcome. However, Wolfrum has 
meaningfully pointed out that international law encompasses 
goal-oriented obligations that compel States to implement an 
evolutionary process leading to no concrete result or to a 
concrete result in some (distant) future.161 Goal-oriented 
obligations without a concrete result would be similar to 
obligations of conduct, for instance, the duty to promote higher 
standards of full employment under UN Charter Articles 55(5). 
Goal-oriented obligations requiring the achievement of a 
 
157. Voigt, supra note 140, at 6. 
158. Id. at 6-7. 
159. Benoît Mayer, Obligations of Conduct in the International Law on Climate Change: 
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(2019). 
160. ILC, supra note 66, at 176. 
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363, 366-67 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010). 
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concrete result, however distant, would be akin to obligations of 
result. These would include duties such as the obligation to 
pursue “a comprehensive policy for the preservation and 
protection of the Alps by applying the principles of prevention, 
payment by the polluter and cooperation,” via the sustainable use 
of resources, such as energy, under Article 2 of the Convention 
on the Protection of the Alps.162 
Within the analytical framework outlined by Wolfrum, the 
duty to curb GHG emissions should be framed as a goal-oriented 
obligation. Indeed, UNFCCC Article 4(1) mentions the “long-term 
temperature goal set out in Article 2.”163 UNFCCC Article 4(1)(c) 
requires the Parties to “[p]romote and cooperate” to “reduce or 
prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases,” whereby 
the use of the word “promote,” in mandatory terms, identifies a 
goal-oriented duty.164 Furthermore, the obligation to stabilize 
GHG emissions should be considered akin to an obligation of 
result, since it entails a commitment on the part of States to 
ensuring a sustainable global average temperature increase 
according to a defined standard, on a cooperative basis. Whilst 
they are classified as obligations of conduct, when they include a 
goal, cooperative duties are classified as obligations of result.165 
Based on Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris Agreement, the minimum 
standard is an average increase well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels, with an effort not to exceed 1.5°C.166 The 
achievement of this objective definitely fulfils the decisive 
distinguishing criterion between goal-oriented obligations akin to 
duties of conduct rather than result, which is the focus of an 
international obligation to achieve “a specific and concrete 
change of facts.”167 Once the result is achieved, there is an 
obligation not to revise the facts, that is, not to change the 
conditions that maintain GHGs within sustainable limits.168 
The language of relevant normative instruments, particularly 
the UNFCCC and related Agreements, is significant for classifying 
 
162. Adopted November 7, 1991; in force March 6, 1995. See Wolfrum, supra note 
161, at 367. 
163. UNFCCC, supra note 7 (emphasis added). 
164. Wolfrum, supra note 161, at 368. 
165. Id. at 373. 
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168. Id. 
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the obligation to achieve a sustainable global temperature 
increase as a goal-oriented duty akin to an obligation of result. 
Notably, UNFCCC Article 2 mentions “[t]he ultimate objective of 
this Convention and any related legal instruments . . . to achieve 
. . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”169 The 
Preamble to the Kyoto Protocol highlights that its norms were 
adopted “[i]n pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention 
[UNFCCC] as stated in its Article 2” to achieve sustainable GHG 
emissions.170 Article 2(1) of the Paris Agreement underscores that 
“in enhancing the implementation of the Convention 
[UNFCCC], including its objective,” the Agreement “aims to 
strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in 
the context of sustainable development.”171 Within this 
framework, Article 2(a) specifies that the Paris Agreement 
“pursue[s] efforts” to limit temperature increase to 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels, but “holds” temperature increase well below 
2°C.172 
The goal-oriented approach to the duty to achieve a 
sustainable increase in global average temperature as an 
obligation akin to a duty of result also allows the understanding 
of the terms of the debate on the bindingness of the UNFCCC 
and related instruments. Most scholars support the binding 
nature of the UNFCCC and related instruments,173 in line with 
the stance of the ILC, correctly in the view of the Author.174 
However, some scholars have argued that the UNFCCC and 
related instruments would only have a declaratory function,175 
whilst others have suggested that these instruments are soft law.176 
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Such different stances can be explained by the fact that goal-
oriented obligations seem to be somewhat “softer” than other 
types of duties, but States are compelled to comply, since a lack 
of performance would trigger responsibility.177 Thus, if the result 
of containing global average temperature increase well below 2°C 
under the Paris Agreement is not achieved, States and 
international organizations should be considered liable: for the 
purpose of determining responsibility, only the result matters.178 
Otherwise, the 2°C objective would only be indicative, with 
catastrophic implications for the environment, according to 
scientific evidence. In this context, the objective is not specifically 
established for each State individually, but collectively for all 
States to achieve in a coordinated manner; therefore, States have 
a certain degree of constraint in the process leading to containing 
anthropogenic GHG emissions within sustainable limits.179 In its 
Draft Guidelines on the Protection of the Atmosphere, the ILC 
has indeed underscored that States have an obligation to 
cooperate with each other and with relevant international 
organizations for the protection of the atmosphere from 
atmospheric pollution and degradation.180 According to the 
Special Rapporteur on the Protection of the atmosphere, 
Professor Murase, “the concept of international cooperation is 
now built to a large extent upon the notion of the ‘common 
interests’ of the ‘international community as a whole’, rather than 
on the ‘arithmetic aggregate’ of bilateral collaborative relations 
in the traditional ‘international society.’”181 
The quantum of the objective to be achieved varies, as the 
evolution from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement 
demonstrates. The limits must be fixed according to scientific 
evidence, based on the precautionary principle.182 Currently, it is 
debatable whether a maximum increase in global average 
temperature well below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels is 
sufficient. In fact, Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris Agreement entails a 
commitment to possibly reducing temperature increase to a 
 
177. Wolfrum, supra note 161, at 368. 
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maximum of 1.5°C, which, according to a recent Report of the 
IPCC, is a critical threshold for preventing extreme effects on 
resources, ecosystems, biodiversity, food security, cities, tourism 
and carbon removal.183 According to scientific reports, only such 
an improved target will be sufficient to preserve the environment 
of the Arctic and the Antarctic, which would otherwise not be able 
to adapt, with serious implications in terms of ice melting, sea-
level rise, change in ocean patterns, and loss of biodiversity.184 
However, there is no mention of the Polar Regions in the 
UNFCCC and related instruments: arguably, they have not been 
adequately taken into account in the negotiating process of 
climate change regulation. 
V. CONSEQUENCES OF A BREACH: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, 
SANCTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT 
There is no justification for a State in breach of a peremptory 
norm.185 Considering that the obligation to curb GHG emissions 
is goal-oriented and cooperative, the question arises as to when 
responsibility actually arises. A possibility would be to assume that 
responsibility arises when the set threshold for temperature 
increase is not achieved. However, this would have catastrophic 
implications for the entire international community and could 
trigger a “race to the bottom,” with little possibility to achieve the 
set aim itself. In this respect, in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros the ICJ noted 
“the often irreversible character of damage to the 
environment,”186 stressing that “a ‘peril’ appearing in the long 
term might be held to be ‘imminent’ as soon as it is established, 
at the relevant point in time, that the realization of that peril, 
however far off it might be, is not thereby any less certain and 
inevitable.”187 Furthermore, peremptory obligations entail for 
States a specific duty to prevent a violation.188 The ILC has 
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underscored that “States have the obligation to protect the 
atmosphere by exercising due diligence in taking appropriate 
measures, in accordance with applicable rules of international 
law, to prevent, reduce or control atmospheric pollution and 
atmospheric degradation.”189 
It should therefore be assumed that responsibility arises 
when a State or international organization does not comply with 
individually scheduled reduction targets.190 Thus, the peremptory 
obligation to achieve a maximum increase well below 2 or 1.5°C 
in global average temperature would encompass a subset of 
peremptory obligations to achieve specific GHG reduction 
targets. However, a State or international organization that is not 
a Party to the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement will not be bound 
by such targets; thus, the problem arises of determining how the 
objectives can be established. The answer is that all injured States 
and international organizations should determine binding 
reduction targets proportionally to per capita emissions, along 
the lines of the decisions of the District Court, Appellate Court, 
and Supreme Court in the case of Urgenda.191 The Conference of 
the Parties to the UNFCCC could determine such measures on 
behalf of the international community as a whole. 
When a State breaches a rule of jus cogens, specific 
procedural consequences apply under the ILC’s 2001 DASR and 
2011 DARIO.192 In fact, if an obligation is owed to the 
international community as a whole and the breach of the 
obligation is of such a character as to radically change the 
position of all the other States and international organizations to 
which the obligation is owed with respect to the further 
performance of the duty, the latter can invoke responsibility.193 
Besides a State or international organization directly affected by 
the breach under DASR and DARIO 42(b)(i), all other indirectly 
affected States and international organizations can invoke the 
responsibility of the injurer under DASR and DARIO 42(b)(ii).194 
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Thus far, the special Rapporteur on the protection of the 
atmosphere has pointed out that “it may be too early at present 
to interpret the concept of common concern as giving ‘all States 
a legal interest, or standing, in the enforcement of rules 
concerning protection of the global atmosphere,’ in view of the 
absence of appropriate procedural law to implement such an 
interpretation.”195 Because of the common interest protected, a 
breach of the peremptory obligation to achieve sustainable 
anthropogenic GHG emissions would affect all States and 
international organizations, triggering universal invocation of 
responsibility. In fact, the ILC’s Draft Conclusions on Peremptory 
Norms provide that “[a]ny State is entitled to invoke the 
responsibility of another State for a breach of a peremptory norm 
of general international law (jus cogens)."196 
Furthermore, under DASR 48 and DARIO 49 any State or 
international organization other than the injured ones can 
invoke responsibility, if the obligation breached is owed to the 
international community as a whole, including cessation, 
assurances of non-repetition, and reparation. According to the 
ILC, a State or international organization entitled to invoke 
responsibility under DASR 48 and DARIO 49 does not act based 
on individual damage, but rather as a member of the 
international community as a whole.197 In the case of the 
obligation to curb GHG emissions, all States and international 
organizations are affected and should thus be entitled to invoke 
responsibility. 
If a breach of jus cogens is “serious,” all States and 
international organizations have an obligation to cooperate and 
invoke responsibility, since DASR 41(b) and DARIO 42(1) 
provide that States and international organizations “shall 
cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means” such 
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violations,198 whereby it is possible to interpret the expression 
“lawful means” so as to also encompass invocation of 
responsibility.199 A breach is “serious” when it entails a “gross or 
systematic failure [to comply].”200 More specifically, “systematic” 
means “carried out in an organized and deliberate way.”201 
“Gross” refers to “the intensity of the violation or its effects” and 
“denotes violations of a flagrant nature.”202 The “systematic” or 
“gross” nature of the violation is based on “the scope and number 
of individual violations” and “the gravity of their consequences 
for the victims.”203 Furthermore, the “seriousness” of a breach 
concerns “the intent to violate the norm.”204 
According to DASR 59 and DARIO 67,205 the outlined 
procedures complement the UN Charter, and can therefore be 
followed by classical dispute resolution mechanisms,206 including 
inquiry, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and 
judicial settlement, according to Chapter VI of the Charter. 
Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that non-compliance with 
sustainable GHG emissions triggers centralized procedures 
centered on the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.207 Indeed, in light of the catastrophic consequences 
predicted by scientific evidence, unsustainable GHG emission 
trends could qualify as a “threat to” or “breach of” the peace 
under UN Charter Article 39.208 Climate change can in fact 
increase conflicts on a global scale in several ways, for instance, by 
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causing loss of resources and territory and migrations.209 This 
possibility actually strengthens the view that the obligation to curb 
GHG emissions is a peremptory one, because only the most 
serious violations of concern to the international community as a 
whole trigger procedures under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.210 Conversely, in light of the dismissal of the projects 
drafted by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz,211 general invocation of 
responsibility does not entail the ability of injured and non-
injured States and international organizations to bring a 
unilateral action in international jurisdictions (actio popularis), 
notably the ICJ.212 This would have afforded a useful remedy to 
implement a goal-oriented obligation and achieve the result of 
ensuring sustainable GHG emissions. 
Sanctions include the classical duties of cessation, non-
repetition and reparation, encompassing restitution, 
compensation and satisfaction under DASR and DARIO 30 and 
31.213 Cessation would entail an obligation to bring the excessive 
GHG emissions of a State or an international organization into 
conformity with required limits, and non-repetition would 
compel keeping GHG emissions within the required standard. 
Reparation should take place via restitutio in integrum, by adding 
excessive GHG emissions to a subsequent reporting period. 
Despite a lack of clarity in relevant normative texts, these are 
fundamentally the sanctions embedded in Articles 5-8 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, with an emphasis on both enforcement and 
facilitation of compliance,214 and under the “global stocktake” 
procedure according to Articles 14 and 15 of the Paris 
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Agreement, with an emphasis on facilitating compliance.215 Of 
course, the peremptory nature of the obligation breached would 
allow such remedies to be extended to non-cooperative States and 
international organizations. Indeed, as concerns their scope, 
sanctions should be erga omnes and peremptory, thus binding a 
State or international organization vis-à-vis all other States and 
organizations of the international community.216 In fact, 
according to DASR and DARIO 33, sanctions may be owed “to 
one or more States, to one or more other organizations, or to the 
international community as a whole, depending in particular on the 
character and content of the international obligation and on the 
circumstances of the breach.”217 This approach is consistent with 
the ILC’s Draft Guidelines on the Protection of the Atmosphere, 
which, in case of “non-compliance”218  due to a lack of capacity, 
require the adoption of facilitative procedures affording 
assistance to States to ensure compliance with relevant 
obligations.219 
If a State or an international organization emitting 
unsustainable GHG emissions does not comply with a sanction 
imposed by means of unilateral invocation of responsibility and 
ensuing procedures, that sanction can be enforced, notably via 
countermeasures, as established in 2001 DASR 49 and DARIO 
51.220 Consistent with 2001 DASR and DARIO 33, DASR 54 and 
DARIO 57 establish the possibility of universal countermeasures 
in the case of a breach of a peremptory norm.221 If the breach of 
a peremptory obligation is “serious,” DASR 41(1) and DARIO 
42(1) create an obligation for States and international 
organizations to cooperate and end it.222 DASR 41(1) and DARIO 
42(1) compel the taking of general countermeasures, and are 
thus lex specialis with respect to DASR 54 and DARIO 57, which 
only establish a right. Countermeasures must be limited in time, 
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reversible and proportionate, since their purpose is bringing the 
breach of an international obligation to an end.223 
A proportionate reaction to the breach of the peremptory 
obligation to curb GHG emissions is the adoption of economic 
countermeasures. Notably, border carbon adjustments (“BCAs”) 
are considered a viable solution,224 particularly in light of the 
jurisprudence of the WTO dispute settlement bodies on 
environmental exceptions to free trade.225 In other words, if a 
State or an international organization is not compliant with set 
GHG reduction targets (primary rules), that State or 
international organization is not paying for the environmental 
externality it causes, so that its products and services have a 
competitive advantage in the international market. All other 
States and international organizations should therefore not only 
be allowed to adopt proportionate BCAs under DASR 54 and 
DARIO 57, but could also be compelled to act so (secondary 
rules) under DASR 41(1) and DARIO 42(1), depending on the 
gravity of the breach. In light of their universal scope, the 
adoption of proportionate BCAs should be decided in a 
coordinated way by the COP to the UNFCCC. If unsustainable 
GHG emissions were to be considered a threat to or breach of the 
peace under UN Charter Article 39, in light of the priority 
established under 2001 DASR 59, DARIO 67, and UN Charter 
Article 103, general countermeasures, particularly trade 
sanctions, would complement collective enforcement via the UN 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.226 
VI. SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATION: EXTENDING THE DUTY TO 
NON-STATE SUBJECTS? 
As concerns attribution of responsibility, a State or an 
international organization must adopt effective domestic 
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legislation to constrain the conduct of natural and legal persons, 
such as energy corporations, and achieve collectively agreed 
international GHG reduction targets. A State’s GHG emissions 
are indeed the result of aggregate emissions produced by all 
natural and legal persons in a given country. The overall 
emissions of an international organization, such as the EU, result 
from the aggregation of emissions within the Member States. 
Crucially, according to the judgment of the Appeals Court in 
Urgenda, as confirmed by the Dutch Supreme Court, in light of 
the commitment to limiting global warming well below 2°C under 
Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, the ECHR establishes an 
“obligation to protect the right to home and private life,” which 
“applies to all activities, public and non-public.”227 It should be 
considered that this is for a State and an international 
organization a goal-oriented obligation of result; in fact, if a State 
or an international organization is not able to prevent excessive 
GHG emissions by all subjects within its territory, that State or 
international organization must be considered in breach of a 
compulsory objective. Of course, non-State subjects are also 
responsible for not achieving established GHG reduction targets. 
The question is therefore whether or not it is possible to conceive 
of a peremptory obligation to achieve sustainable GHG emissions 
also with respect to persons other than sovereign entities. 
According to the evolution of international law, general 
peremptory obligations address not only sovereign entities, but 
also non-State persons, including natural and legal persons. 
Notably, whilst the select circle of peremptory obligations is not 
clearly defined, the obligations that are undoubtedly peremptory 
address non-State persons as both right-holders and duty-
bearers.228 In Furundžjia, the International Criminal Tribuanl for 
the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) clarified that the jus cogens 
nature of a prohibition has a preemptive effect, signaling “to all 
members of the international community and the individuals over whom 
they wield authority” an “absolute value from which nobody must 
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deviate.”229 Furthermore, according to UNDRD Article 2(3), the 
right to development incorporates external State–State and 
internal State–people and State–individual duty–right relations, 
which complement an individual right to be enjoyed by every 
person and a collective right belonging to all peoples and 
States.230 
From the standpoint of attribution of liability, the 
peremptory nature of the obligation to curb GHG emissions 
would entail the responsibility of all GHG emitters in breach of 
sustainable thresholds in a given country. The peremptory nature 
of the obligation would allow these persons to be held 
responsible, regardless of whether they act secundum or contra 
legem. In fact, in Furundžjia, the ICTY considered that conduct 
permitted by national law, but in breach of peremptory norms, 
remains internationally unlawful and is actionable in any State.231 
This stance can be questioned in the context of States that take a 
dualistic approach to international law. However, as peremptory 
norms always override domestic legislation, it should be 
considered that also in a dualistic context an individual can be 
held responsible for contributing to failing to achieve established 
GHG reduction targets.232 
From the standpoint of the persons affected by the violation, 
the breach of a peremptory obligation damages all State and non-
State subjects of the international community. Accordingly, in 
Furundžjia the ICTY held that the individual breach of an 
international obligation has an “inherently universal 
character.”233 The breach of a peremptory obligation to curb 
GHG emissions would thus affect not only all other sovereign 
entities of the international community, but also all other non-
State entities and natural persons. 
The consequences of the breach of a peremptory norm for 
individuals have been mostly elaborated in the context of 
international criminal law, where the violation of an erga omnes 
obligation leads to universal and supranational prosecution 
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within the framework of international cooperation.234 
Considering that the obligation to curb GHG emissions is 
peremptory not only for States and international organizations, 
but also for non-State natural and legal persons, would mainly 
entail consequences in the sphere of torts. Depending on the 
seriousness of the breach,235 a relevant implication would be the 
exclusion of jurisdictional immunity for responsible natural 
persons acting for a State in not ensuring compliance with agreed 
reduction targets.236 Possibly, the exclusion of jurisdictional 
immunity could also extend to a State or an international 
organization in breach of the obligation to stabilize 
anthropogenic GHG emissions, allowing adjudication by foreign 
courts.237 Another implication could be the establishment of 
universal civil jurisdiction. Whereas the principle of universal 
jurisdiction has fundamentally been developed in the context of 
criminal law, it is also progressively developing in the framework 
of civil claims.238 Thus, proceedings could be initiated by potential 
victims having locus standi “before a competent international or 
national judicial body with a view to asking it to hold the national 
measure to be internationally unlawful,” including “a civil suit for 
damage in a foreign court, which would therefore be asked inter 
alia to disregard the legal value of the national authorizing act.”239 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Peremptory norms (jus cogens) include erga omnes 
obligations, that is, indivisible duties owed by a subject to the 
international community as a whole, which are therefore non-
derogable by means of bilateral or multilateral agreements. 
Several consistent practices at the international and domestic 
level allow the consideration that the obligation to achieve 
sustainable anthropogenic GHG concentrations in the 
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atmosphere specified in UNFCCC Article 2 is evolving as a 
peremptory duty, as a sub-species of the universal obligation to 
achieve environmental sustainability. 
First, the UNFCCC and related instruments register quasi-
universal participation and there is no apparent persistent 
objection. Acceptance and recognition by a very large majority of 
States is necessary for the identification of a norm as a peremptory 
rule, not absolute consensus. The recognition of the importance 
of the obligation to curb GHG emissions for “humankind” 
embedded in the Preamble to the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement 
can be read as a sign of such acceptance. The Paris Agreement 
also significantly extends mitigation targets to all the Parties. 
Second, the evolution of the work of the ILC on the responsibility 
of States and international organizations, soft and hard law 
initiatives, particularly on human rights, as well as the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ, show that massive environmental 
pollution is evolving as a fundamental erga omnes norm. Third, 
domestic constitutional and statutory legislation, as well as the 
jurisprudence of domestic courts, allow the inference of a general 
principle of law compelling sustainable GHG emissions. This 
evidence is corroborated by the supportive practice of profit and 
non-profit NGOs and grassroots movements. 
Considering the structure of the obligation, the atmosphere 
and climate are “global commons,” which clash with a relativist 
approach to the duty to curb GHG emissions. Non-compliance 
indeed affects all State and non-State subjects of the international 
community. The unilateral or multilateral suspension of a 
conventional obligation by the injured States and international 
organizations under VCLT and VCLTIO Article 60 discloses the 
possibility of a dissolution of the UNFCCC and related 
instruments. In light of available scientific data, ensuring a 
sustainable climate is emerging as the most fundamental 
environmental interest of the international community, 
overriding bilateral and multilateral interests. The shared and 
fundamental nature of the protected interest compels shifting the 
focus from an integral and derogable erga omnes partes obligation 
to a universal erga omnes duty. Within such a framework, even if a 
persistent objection were to arise, the peremptory nature of the 
obligation would override it. 
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In light of UNFCCC Article 2, it should be considered that 
all States and international organizations have a goal-oriented 
cooperative duty akin to an obligation of result. Article 2 of the 
Paris Agreement spells out in detail this obligation by outlining a 
maximum temperature increase well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels. The threshold of sustainability is debatable and 
should arguably be improved to a minimum of 1.5°C, given that 
a lower standard entails irreversible consequences for areas 
particularly affected by climate change, notably the Polar 
Regions, with further severe implications for the global climate. 
A State or an international organization should therefore be held 
in breach of the obligation to curb GHG emissions when it does 
not comply with set reduction targets aiming to achieve the 
collective goal. This should trigger universal invocation of 
responsibility, an obligation for a State or an international 
organization to bring excessive GHG emissions into conformity 
with required limits, and enforcement via universal 
countermeasures, notably BTAs, under the DASR and DARIO. 
Such procedures are subordinate to collective measures 
undertaken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. 
In light of the evolution of international law, the obligation 
to achieve a sustainable concentration of anthropogenic GHG 
emissions in the atmosphere could also address non-State natural 
and legal persons as both duty-bearers and right-holders, waiving 
immunity and triggering universal jurisdiction for particularly 
serious violations. It is therefore impelling to seize the ICJ of the 
question to deliver an authoritative opinion as to whether 
international law includes a peremptory obligation to achieve 
sustainable concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, and what 
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